Bischkek. Wieder gab es Krawalle an der bedeutenden Goldmine in Kumtor, Kirgisistan. Nach der Auflösung der Sowjetunion ließ das Land eine kanadische Firma herein, die ungeahnte Investitionen versprach. Es blieb jedoch kaum Reichtum im Land hängen, dafür aber jede Menge Zyanid. Die massenhaft vergifteten Kirgisen haben die Nase voll von dem unfairen Abkommen, dass eine korrupte Regierung mit dem Konzern schloss. Zudem läuft im Juni der vor einem Jahr von Bischkek gekündigte Vertrag über die US-Militärbasis Manas aus, dem wichtigsten Drehkreuz bei Obamas Rückzug vom Hindukusch.
Im Mai vergangenen Jahres hatte Präsident Almasbek Atambajew schon einmal den Notstand rund um die Kumtor-Mine in der Region Issik-Kul ausrufen müssen. Die Kirgisen hatten genug vom Warten auf das Eintreffen der großen Versprechungen der Investoren, und hatten zuvor von dem kanadischen Bergbauunternehmen Centerra Gold verlangt, in den Siedlungen der Bergarbeiter wenigstens Spitäler einzurichten und die Infrastruktur zu verbessern. Hunderte Menschen hatten das örtliche Elektrizitätswerk gestürmt, das die kanadische Centerra mit Strom versorgt, um die Stromversorgung zu kappen. Die Demonstranten forderten schon damals die Verstaatlichung der Mine, die beachtliche 3,57 Gramm Gold pro Tonne Erz erbringt.

Centerra Gold Inc.
Gold und Gift: Zyanid mit Grüßen aus Kanada
Das deutsche Außenministerium informiert in seiner „Kurzcharakterisierung“ der kirgisischen Wirtschaft:
„Mit einem Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) von nominal 5,7 Mrd. US-Dollar (2012) und pro Kopf 1.137 US-Dollar (2012) sowie einem unter der Armutsgrenze lebenden Bevölkerungsanteil von rund 37% ist Kirgisistan ein armes Land… Kirgisistan ist stark abhängig von der mit Abstand bedeutendsten und größten ausländischen Investition, der Goldmine Kumtor, die einen erheblichen Anteil an BIP (2012: 5,5%) und Industrieproduktion (2012: 46%) hat… Gold ist auch wichtigstes Ausfuhrgut Kirgisistans. 2011 lag sein Anteil an den Ausfuhren bei 45% und in den ersten zehn Monaten 2012 trotz Problemen in der Mine Kumtor immerhin noch bei 24%.“ Auswärtiges Amt
Einer der Gründe, aus denen der Neoliberalismus überall die Staatskassen leert und Völker in Schuldknechtschaft bringt, ist der Zugriff auf Rohstoffe. Wen man hungern lässt, der denkt nicht an Umweltverseuchung, wenn Konzerne Schürfrechte einfordern. Gerade Kanadas Schürffirmen gehen dabei oft rücksichtslos vor und gefährden Umwelt, Trinkwasser und die Gesundheit der Bevölkerung. Die Kumtor-Goldmine die ist größte von einer westlichen Firma betriebene Goldmine in Zentralasien. Das kanadische Unternehmen „Cameco“ begann dort Ende 1996 mit dem Goldabbau, mittlerweile hat „Centerra Gold“ das Geschäft übernommen, die 2004 aus dem Mutterunternehmen Cameco ausgegliedert wurde. Die Kumtor-Mine ist ihr Filetstück und fördert etwa 20 Tonnen Gold jährlich, wobei sie zur Gewinnung des Metalls eine giftige chemische Lösung verwendet. Eine Grundkomponente dieser Lösung ist Zyanid, als Salz der Blausäure wasserlöslich und hochgiftig. Angeblich sei das nicht gefährlich für Mensch und Umwelt, betont Rodin Stuparek, Direktor der Umweltschutz-Abteilung in Kumtor in dw. „Wir gehen sehr verantwortungsvoll mit dem Zyanid um.“
Seit dem Unfall vom Mai 1998 bei Barskoon glaubt man den Kanadiern nicht mehr. Damals stürzte in der Nähe der Ortschaft Barskoon ein LKW mit einer Ladung von mehr als 20 Tonnen Zyanid für die Goldmine Kumtor in einen Fluss, aus dem sich die Bevölkerung mit Trinkwasser versorgt. Unklar ist bis heute, wie viele Menschen damals an Zyanid-Vergiftung starben. Heute erinnert man sich noch an die Panik, die damals um sich griff. Die Regierung hatte die Menschen nicht über die Gefahren informiert, aber die Leute wurden plötzlich umgesiedelt, auf die andere Seite des Sees.
Kirgisistan, Tunesien Zentralasiens
Kirgistan gilt als das Tunesien Zentralasiens: Seine parlamentarische Demokratie funktioniert einigermaßen gut, im Vergleich der von Despotien dominierten Region. Der Weg dahin war nicht einfach: Der autoritäre Ex-Präsident Kurmanbek Bakijew galt nach der kirgisischen Tulpenrevolution 2005 als Hoffnungsträger, war zunächst Chef der Übergangsregierung. Noch selben Jahr gewann er die Neuwahlen und wurde Präsident, nur um 2010 bei erneuten Massenprotesten mit vielen Toten wieder aus dem Amt gejagt zu werden.
Jüngst wurde Bakijew in Abwesenheit wegen Mordversuchs zu 25 Jahren Haft verurteilt, weil er einen Mordanschlag in Bischkek 2006 in Auftrag gegeben hatte – Weißrussland verweigert die Auslieferung. Zielperson war ein britischer Geschäftsmann, der sich im Auftrag eines ausländischen Unternehmens mit der Regierung um die Goldmine Kumtor stritt. Der Brite hatte das Attentat schwer verletzt überlebt. Bakijews beträchtliches Vermögen wurde vom Gericht beschlagnahmt. Der Ex-Präsident lebt mit seiner Familie im Exil in Weißrussland, das eine Auslieferung ablehnt. Sein Bruder Schanybek, ehemaliger Chef des Staatsschutzes, und sein Sohn Maxim wurden im selben Fall ebenfalls in Abwesenheit zu lebenslanger Haft verurteilt. Ein zweiter Sohn, Marat Bakijew, erhielt 20 Jahre Gefängnis. Bakijew war im Februar bereits wegen dreifachen Mordes zu 24 Jahren Haft verurteilt worden. Dabei hatte der blutige, aber dem Westen zugeneigte Diktator Bakijew durchaus Freunde im Ausland, z.B. bei der deutschen Tageszeitung taz, die ihm nach seinem Sturz tränenreich nachweinte und gefühlvoll seine „Flucht unter Kirschbäume“ schilderte:
„DSCHALALABAD taz | Eine Jurte steht zwischen blühenden Kirschbäumen. Darin sitzt, frisch rasiert und in einem grauen Anzug, der aus Bischkek geflohene kirgisische Präsident Kurmanbek Bakijew in einem grünen Sessel. Der Handdruck ist weich. „Ich bin nach wie vor der Präsident Kirgisiens“, sagt Bakijew mit sanfter Stimme…“taz 12.4.2010
Heute kämpft der neue Präsident Almasbek Atambajew für die Aufhebung des Abkommens aus dem Jahre 2009, in dem der damalige Präsident Bakijew den kanadischen Goldausbeutern günstige Produktionsbedingungen und Steuererleichterungen eingeräumt hatte.
Gold, Geopolitik und Militärbasen
In Kirgisistan, auch Kirgisien genannt, gibt es eine relativ freie Presse und eine vielfältige Parteienlandschaft. Doch die Wirtschaft kommt trotz großartiger Versprechungen der westlichen Investoren nicht in Gang, obwohl viele Milliarden an Gold aus dem Land geschafft wurden. Ein beträchtlicher Teil der arbeitsfähigen Bevölkerung verdient als Gastarbeiter in Russland Geld, das in die Heimat zurückfließt. Leider liegt das Land im Visier der US-Geopolitik: Ein US-Luftwaffenstützpunkt für den Afghanistankrieg, 2001 mit Putins Zustimmung errichtet, damals mit Washington im „Kampf gegen den Terror“ noch traulich vereint, später errichtete Russland wenige Kilometer davon entfernt eine eigene Militärbasis.
Die Luftwaffenbasis am Flughafen Manas in Kirgistan ist seit 2001 der wichtigste Luftumschlagplatz der US-Streitkräfte für den Krieg in Afghanistan und auch für den inzwischen begonnenen Rückzug. Der Flughafen Manas liegt unweit der Hauptstadt Bischkek besteht aus einer Containerstadt, die von Betonmauern umgeben ist. Im Mai 2013 kündigte die kirgisische Regierung die Verträge mit den USA über die Basis Manas zum Juni 2014. Hintergrund sind wieder enger werdende Beziehungen zu Russland.
2012 hatte Putin ein Milliarden-Programm für den Ausbau der Wasserkraft angeboten, Kirgisiens zweitem Reichtum neben den Bodenschätzen. Dazu noch einen Schuldenerlass und die Übernahme des maroden kirgisischen Gasnetzes durch die russische Gazprom, Gerhard Schröder lässt grüßen. Bereits 2008 hatte Russland Kirgistan Unterstützung angeboten, um die Abhängigkeit vom Westen zu verringern. Der damalige Präsident Bakijew nahm die Entwicklungshilfe, doch die US-Militärbasis blieb im Land, sie wurde lediglich in „Transitzentrum“ umbenannt. 2010 fegte ein Aufstand Bakijew aus dem Land und seither kam das Land Moskau wieder näher, wozu vermutlich auch die katastrophalen Erfahrungen mit den Goldplünderern aus Kanada ihren Beitrag leistete.
Mein Name ist Hasipedia –ich weiß von nichts
Die deutsche Wikipedia weiß übrigens nichts vom verzweifelten Kampf der Kirgisen um ihr Gold und ihr Leben gegen die zynische Goldgier westlicher Firmen. Dort zeichnen die von Firmen-Lobbyisten dominierten oder sonstwie geschmierten „Wikipedianer“ eine fröhliches Bild von funktionierender Demokratie und bunter Folklore.
Sogar die ARD-Tagesschau meldet, was Wikipedia nicht weiß: „Im Nordosten Kirgistans liegt eine der größten Goldminen der Welt, eine kanadische Firma baut das Gold dort ab. Doch anstatt Wohlstand für die Bevölkerung bringt die Mine eine massive Zerstörung der Natur mit sich.“ Goldabbau in Kirgistan: Viel Schaden, wenig Nutzen
WikipeCIA will offenbar nicht, dass die dummen Deutschen etwas vom Gold in Kirgistan mitkriegen, obwohl dies sogar auf der Website des deutschen AA (Bundesaußenministerium) zu lesen steht –wo man zwar immerhin vom Gold, aber nicht von den seltenen Erden der Kirgisen weiß.
Gerade in Europa, wo ökologisches Bewusstsein und hohe Bildung die Menschen kritisch machen, versucht die neoliberale Finanz- und Goldmafia Staaten in die Pleite zu treiben, um billig an ihre Bodenschätze zu gelangen: Griechenland und Spanien sind vielleicht nicht zufällig ins Fadenkreuz der Finanzbetrüger geraten, dort lagern große Goldvorräte. In zerschlagenen Staaten meinen Ausbeutungsfirmen sich nicht groß um die Zyanidverseuchung des Trinkwassers und die Zerstörung ganzer Landstriche sorgen zu müssen, wenn sie das Gold säckeweise aus dem Boden holen und wegschleppen.
Kampf gegen den Goldraub in Chalkidiki
Finanzkrise und Goldrausch: Madrid und Athen
Griechenland 2016 größter Goldproduzent Europas
Bakijew hatte viele Freunde in den USA, kein Wunder:
„As the only U.S.-operated transit facility in Central Asia, the Manas Transit Center plays a critical role in
transporting U.S. and coalition personnel and equipment as part of President Obama’s Afghanistan strategy.
In 2009, the Transit Center served on average some 24,000 transiting Coalition forces and some 450 short tons of cargo per month. In January 2010, approximately 30,000 personnel and 600 short tons of cargo passed through the Transit Center, and it will likely remain at capacity over the next six months.
The Transit Center also provides 30 percent of the air refueling over Afghanistan.“
Volle US-Depesche aus Bishkek:
http://www.cabledrum.net/cables/10BISHKEK113
Reference ID: 10BISHKEK113
Subject: SCENESETTER FOR SRAP HOLBROOKE’S VISIT TO KYRGYZSTAN
Origin: Embassy Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Created: 16 Feb 2010 Released: 30 Aug 2011
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 000113
SIPDIS
FOR SRAP AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2020
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SRAP HOLBROOKE’S VISIT TO
KYRGYZSTAN
Classified By: Ambassador Tatiana C. Gfoeller, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).
1. (C) Embassy Bishkek welcomes the visit of Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard C.
Holbrooke to Kyrgyzstan on February 19. Your visit comes at
a timely period as the U.S.-Kyrgyzstan relationship has
experienced positive momentum since the signing of the new
agreement for the Transit Center at Manas International
Airport. Your visit will provide an opportunity to express
the U.S.’s appreciation for using the Transit Center and
emphasize to the Kyrgyz the importance we place on our
bilateral relationship, as well as brief on U.S. goals in
Afghanistan.
U.S.-KYRGYZSTAN RELATIONSHIP
—————————-
2. (C) Since the signing of the Transit Center agreement in
the summer of 2009, the U.S.-Kyrgyzstan partnership has
improved significantly as the Government of Kyrgyzstan moved
closer to the U.S. In September, President Bakiyev made an
extremely successful and public visit to the Transit Center
to participate in a September 11th memorial service. Based
on recent meetings with senior government officials, it
appears that the Government of Kyrgyzstan is interested in
working with the U.S. and building a closer relationship. At
the same time, the Government of Kyrgyzstan is also actively
reviewing the state of its relationships with its neighbors,
Russia, and China, seeking a balance which would best serve
its interests. The Kyrgyz government has been watching
carefully President Obama’s strategy in Afghanistan,
especially the transfer of responsibility to the Afghan
government in 2011, and a key concern of the government is
what role the U.S. intends to play in Kyrgyzstan in the
medium and long-term.
MANAS TRANSIT CENTER
——————–
3. (C) As the only U.S.-operated transit facility in Central
Asia, the Manas Transit Center plays a critical role in
transporting U.S. and coalition personnel and equipment as
part of President Obama’s Afghanistan strategy. In 2009, the
Transit Center served on average some 24,000 transiting
Coalition forces and some 450 short tons of cargo per month.
In January 2010, approximately 30,000 personnel and 600 short
tons of cargo passed through the Transit Center, and it will
likely remain at capacity over the next six months. The
Transit Center also provides 30 percent of the air refueling
over Afghanistan.
4. (C) The Transit Center Agreement requires that the U.S.
notify Kyrgyzstan by April 14 if it intends to renew the
agreement for another year. We have received no indication
from the Kyrgyz that they are looking to renegotiate the
agreement this year. However, it is clear to us that they
are following very closely our compliance with its terms and
with other commitments we have made, reviewing the benefits
they derive from their cooperation with the U.S., and judging
our long-term commitment to the region. If they decide their
interests are not being served by the agreement as it stands,
there is no doubt that they will reopen negotiations. The
key issues in the Kyrgyz appraisal will likely be the $15
million quarterly payment, the construction projects at the
airport/Transit Center, the air traffic control project, the
Economic Development Fund, levels of continuing U.S.
assistance, implementation of joint security at the Transit
Center, promised counternarcotics and counter-terrorism
funding, and economic benefits from contracting from both the
Transit Center and the Northern Distribution Network.
POLITICAL OVERVIEW
BISHKEK 00000113 002 OF 003
——————
5. (C) Since its independence nearly 18 years ago, Kyrgyzstan
has been noteworthy for the relative openness of its
political discourse and vibrancy of its civil society.
Although still the leader in the region, Kyrgyzstan remains a
fledgling democracy. It boasts a political opposition, an
independent press that occasionally criticizes the
government, and credible freedoms of religion, speech and
assembly. However, recent trends find the government dialing
back on these basic rights.
6. (C) In July 2009, President Bakiyev was re-elected as
President in an election that many international observers
characterized as flawed. Over the past several years,
President Bakiyev has moved to consolidate political power
and to divide and suppress the opposition. Opposition
political parties face ongoing harassment, and the government
actively uses criminal charges to threaten opposition
leaders. In 2009, a number of opposition politicians and
journalists were attacked and beaten, culminating in the
death in Almaty, Kazakhstan, of Gennady Pavlyuk, a Kyrgyz
journalist. To date, Kyrgyz and Kazakh authorities have not
made any arrests in the Pavlyuk case.
ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
—————–
7. (C) Under Bakiyev, state budget expenditures — including
salaries and pensions — have grown steadily, but poverty
remains widespread. In 2009, Kyrgyzstan benefited from
significantly increased financial support from the
international financial institutions and other donors. In
addition, the Russian government has provided a $150 million
grant and a $300 million low-interest loan to the Kyrgyz
government in 2009. With much of its financial system
isolated from global markets, Kyrgyzstan weathered the
effects of the global economic downturn relatively well. The
economic slowdown in Russia and Kazakhstan, however, severely
reduced the amount of remittances Kyrgyz workers sent home.
Kyrgyz workers abroad send home an estimated $1 billion, or
20-25% of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP, annually. (Russia and Kazakhstan
provide jobs for nearly 1 million Kyrgyz workers, or over one
third of the workforce.) In addition, pervasive corruption
at all levels of government is a barrier to economic
development, effective service provision, and foreign
investment.
BORDER ISSUES
————-
8. (C) The absence of demarcated and delineated borders
between Kyrgyzstan and its Tajik and Uzbek neighbors has
fueled occasional clashes between residents and each
government’s border services. In addition, the government is
hyper-sensitive to the threat of Islamic separatism in the
South. In May 2009, IMU/IJU militants launched attacks on
Uzbek security facilities on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border, and an
additional militant blew himself up outside a police station
in Andijon, Uzbekistan. The Uzbek government claimed that
these attacks were launched from Kyrgyz soil. In June,
Kyrgyz security forces located and clashed with IMU/IJU
militants linked to the May attacks in Uzbekistan in various
villages in southern Kyrgyzstan, resulting in the deaths of
nine militants and one police officer.
U.S. ASSISTANCE
—————
9. (C) The U.S. has a range of active bilateral assistance
programs, including IMET, FMF, EXBS, and INL. USAID is
providing over $20 million in assistance to Kyrgyzstan, with
programs in economic growth, health care, education, and
BISHKEK 00000113 003 OF 003
democracy and governance. The Kyrgyz government, however, is
deeply suspicious of some democracy programming, believing
that the U.S. uses these programs to fund the political
opposition, destabilize the country, and foster „color
revolutions.“ Government hardliners complain about the
National Democratic Institute and other democracy
implementers as being biased against the government and
interfering with domestic politics.
MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT
————————–
10. (C) During your meeting with President Bakiyev, he is
certain to raise his „Bishkek Initiative,“ a proposal to host
an international conference on security and stability in the
Central Asia region, including Afghanistan, for which he will
be seeking U.S. support. At the Turkey conference on
Afghanistan in January, Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Sarbayev gave
Deputy SRAP Paul Jones a non-paper detailing the „Bishkek
Initiative.“ Your expression of interest in at least hearing
more details about how the Kyrgyz envision this initiative
will please Bakiyev.
GFOELLER
Aha, da liest einer noch die Depeschen auf WL
Die US-Regierung beobachtete die Beziehung Moskau-Bischkek sehr genau:
Russian officials are closely watching the U.S.-Uzbek thaw for any renewed U.S. military ties with Uzbekistan. Russia seems less cautious regarding U. S. economic engagement with Uzbekistan, particularly if U.S.investment helps to improve the overall economic climate in the country.
http://www.cabledrum.net/diff/10MOSCOW337
Reference ID: 10MOSCOW337
Subject: RUSSIAN RELATIONS WITH AN ASSERTIVE UZBEKISTAN
Origin: Embassy Moscow, Russia Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Created: 17 Feb 2010 Released: 18 Feb 2011
——————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000337
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, SCA, INR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, UZ, RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN RELATIONS WITH AN ASSERTIVE UZBEKISTAN
MOSCOW 00000337 001.2 OF 002
C…
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000337 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, SCA, INR E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, UZ, RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN RELATIONS WITH AN ASSERTIVE UZBEKISTAN MOSCOW 00000337 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Susan M. Elliott for reason
s: 1.4 (b), (d).
1. (C) Summary: In recent meetings, MFA and Uzbek Embassy
officials stressed the positive aspects of Russian-Uzbek
relations, including bilateral trade anQd Uzbek migrant
workers in Russia. Uzbek President Karimov is due to visit
Moscow in April following intergovernmental talks.
Meanwhile, Russian officials have expressed frustration with
Uzbek unwillingness to follow Russian proposals in regional
fora and with Uzbekistan’s tense relations with its weaker
neighbors. An Uzbek Embassy official was quick to highlight
the „new political dynamics“ in the region, in which an
increasingly assertive Uzbekistan stands up for its national
interest. Comment: Russian officials are closely watching the
U.S.-Uzbek thaw for any renewed U.S. military ties with
Uzbekistan. Russia seems less cautious regarding
U. S. economic engagement with Uzbekistan, particularly if U.S.
investment helps to improve the overall economic climate in
the country. End Summary.
Partners, but No Longer Strategic?
———————————-
2. (C) MFA Third CIS Department Second Secretary Kiril
Belikov told poloff that Uzbekistan is Russia’s „second
partner“ in the region, after Kazakhstan, noting that
Uzbekistan has the largest and fastest growing population in
former-Soviet Central Asia (27 million) and influences ethnic
Uzbek minorities in all of its neighboring countries,
including Afghanistan. In a separate meeting, Second
Secretary Yekaterina Chistova said that relations with
Uzbekistan are fundamentally strong, despite some negative
aspects, and noted that regular high-level bilateral dialogue
resumed in 2009. Following President Medvedev’s trip early
in 2009, FM Lavrov visited Tashkent in December, the first
Russian FM visit since 2005, according to MFA officials.
Uzbek Embassy officials told us that President Karimov is
scheduled to visit Moscow in late April, following upcoming
intergovernmental meetings chaired by the Uzbek PM and
Russian Deputy PM Sergei Ivanov.
3. (C) Uzbek Embassy Political Counselor Farkhad Khamraev
termed relations with Russia as „stable and positive,“
although he was quick to dispel any perception that Russia
still dominated the relationship. He said the West should
understand that „the old political dynamics in the region
have changed,“ and that Uzbekistan pursued its own national
interest. Offering an example of the „new dynamics,“
Khamraev (quite boldly) claimed that Russia scaled down its
plans for a military base in southern Kyrgyzstan after the
Uzbeks voiced concerns about its proximity to their border.
He said the facility would now be used as a training center
for the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
4. (C) Stressing that stability is Russia’s primary interest
in Central Asia, MFA officials said that Russia has urged
Uzbekistan to resolve ongoing border water and electricity
disputes with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, but that there has
been a lack of „political will.“ The Uzbek Embassy’s
Khamraev maintained that Russia supported Uzbek views on
water rights in the region and that this was not a point of
disagreement with Moscow. In regional multilateral
groupings, MFA Department of Asia-Pacific Cooperation
officials cited a number of Russian proposals which the
Uzbeks have effectively blocked. Khamraev said that
Uzbekistan wanted to ensure that its voice was heard among
the larger players. He said Uzbekistan has chosen not to
participate in certain Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO) activities, despite currently serving as the SCO
Chairman, and has halted its cooperation with the Eurasian
Economic Community because „Uzbekistan was better off with
bilateral discussions.“ Khamraev said the CSTO was a
worthwhile security grouping that could provide some security
guarantees, but that Uzbekistan participated selectively
according to its national interests. Moscow experts noted MOSCOW 00000337 002.2 OF 002 that Uzbekistan has refused to join the CSTO Rapid Reaction
Force, a decision that renders the CSTO „worthless“ as a
regional security grouping in the opinion of Moscow Carnegie
Center’s Alexei Malashenko.
5. (C) Central Asia expert Ivan Safranchuk, publisher of the
journal „Bolshaya Igra“ (The Great Game), told us that
Karimov’s personal relationship with Medvedev has been sour
from the beginning. Safranchuk said Karimov has shown little
respect for Medvedev and once told PM Putin (allegedly in
Medvedev’s presence) that Putin should have found a way to
remain the Russian President. Safranchuk added that
Gazprom’s clumsy handling of Uzbek interests in the Caspian
gas pipeline project dispelled Uzbek notions that Russia was
a „strategic partner.“ Safranchuk also maintained that the
„real Karimov“ was genuinely eager for respect and good
relations with the U.S. and the West, as he was in late 2001,
and that he was not the Karimov we saw after the fallout over
Andijon.
Resilient Economic Ties
———————–
6. (C) Separately, both the MFA’s Chistova and the Uzbek
Embassy’s Khamraev emphasized the resilience of the bilateral
economic relationship. Chistova said that while annual
bilateral trade fell by 30-35 percent in the economic crisis,
to around USD 2 billion, the drop was less than that with
many of Russia’s European trading partners. Noting Russia is
Uzbekistan’s largest foreign market, Khamraev said that
bilateral trade was relatively unaffected by the crisis, with
the exception of a large drop in automobile exports to
Russia. He added that trade prospects were promising and, in
particular, that discussions were underway to export Uzbek
cotton directly to Russia, bypassing European markets.
Mutual Dependence on Migrants
—————————–
7. (C) MFA and Uzbek Embassy officials also highlighted the
mutual importance of Uzbek migrant workers in Russia. The
MFA’s Chistova estimated that between two and three million
Uzbeks work in Russia, including illegal workers, and that
annual remittances from Uzbek workers in Russia total more
than USD 2 billion. Chistova also underscored that Uzbek
migrants help to maintain important cultural ties by learning
the Russian language and culture. The Uzbek Embassy’s
Khamraev claimed annual remittances were closer to USD 3
billion, off 10-20 percent from their peak before the
economic crisis, and that the two governments will discuss an
agreement on migrant labor at meetings in March. Suggesting
that leverage on migrant labor issues is no longer one-sided,
Khamraev argued that despite political rhetoric, high
unemployment figures, and the recent uptick in birth rates,
Russia has a critical long-term need for foreign labor.
8. (C) Comment: Beyond official pleasantries, Russian
relations with an increasingly assertive Uzbekistan remain
prickly. Russia has limited leverage with Uzbekistan on
regional issues and within regional fora such as the SCO and
CSTO. Uzbek assertiveness in the region is likely only to
grow, and some Moscow analysts expect Uzbekistan’s population
to approach 50 million by 2050. Meanwhile, Russian officials
are closely watching developments in the U.S.-Uzbek thaw.
Given Russian sensitivities about foreign military activities
in Central Asia, a renewed U.S. military relationship with
Uzbekistan is likely Russia’s greatest concern. Russian
officials have said they consider NATO activities in its
backyard to be temporary and limited to supporting the
international coalition in Afghanistan. In contrast to its
„sphere of privileged interests“ in the military sense,
Russia appears less resistant to U.S. and other foreign
economic influence in Central Asia, and may even welcome U.S.
investment in certain sectors, as Russian firms stand to
benefit from improved economic policies and infrastructure
that such foreign investment may bring. End Comment.
Beyrle
Wer die US-Sicht dazu lesen möchte…
Zum Putsch gegen Bakijew:
„Some Western and Russian media and Russian analysts have asserted that Russia largely
orchestrated the coup because of dissatisfaction that Baliyev had not closed the Manas Transit
Center as promised.
In contrast, the coup in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 was attributed by some officials
in Russia and Central Asia to influence by the United States through pro-democracy assistance to
non-governmental organizations. The United States denied any direct influence. According to this
Russian triumphalist view, however, Bakiyev’s ouster represents the removal of a regional leader
who had been backed by the United States.“ Jim Nichol 2010, p.5
The April 2010 Coup in Kyrgyzstan: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests
Jim Nichol
April 2010
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Klicke, um auf R41178.pdf zuzugreifen