Centerra Gold unter Druck: Proteste in Kirgisistan

Galindo Gaznate Kirgistan-flag

Bischkek. Wieder gab es Krawalle an der bedeutenden Goldmine in Kumtor, Kirgisistan. Nach der Auflösung der Sowjetunion ließ das Land eine kanadische Firma herein, die ungeahnte Investitionen versprach. Es blieb jedoch kaum Reichtum im Land hängen, dafür aber jede Menge Zyanid. Die massenhaft vergifteten Kirgisen haben die Nase voll von dem unfairen Abkommen, dass eine korrupte Regierung mit dem Konzern schloss. Zudem läuft im Juni der vor einem Jahr von Bischkek gekündigte Vertrag über die US-Militärbasis Manas aus, dem wichtigsten Drehkreuz bei Obamas Rückzug vom Hindukusch.

Im Mai vergangenen Jahres hatte Präsident Almasbek Atambajew schon einmal den Notstand rund um die Kumtor-Mine in der Region Issik-Kul ausrufen müssen. Die Kirgisen hatten genug vom Warten auf das Eintreffen der großen Versprechungen der Investoren, und hatten zuvor von dem kanadischen Bergbauunternehmen Centerra Gold verlangt, in den Siedlungen der Bergarbeiter wenigstens Spitäler einzurichten und die Infrastruktur zu verbessern. Hunderte Menschen hatten das örtliche Elektrizitätswerk gestürmt, das die kanadische Centerra mit Strom versorgt, um die Stromversorgung zu kappen. Die Demonstranten forderten schon damals die Verstaatlichung der Mine, die beachtliche 3,57 Gramm Gold pro Tonne Erz erbringt.

Centerra Gold Inc.

Centerra Gold Inc.

Gold und Gift: Zyanid mit Grüßen aus Kanada

Das deutsche Außenministerium informiert in seiner „Kurzcharakterisierung“ der kirgisischen Wirtschaft:

„Mit einem Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) von nominal 5,7 Mrd. US-Dollar (2012) und pro Kopf 1.137 US-Dollar (2012) sowie einem unter der Armutsgrenze lebenden Bevölkerungsanteil von rund 37% ist Kirgisistan ein armes Land… Kirgisistan ist stark abhängig von der mit Abstand bedeutendsten und größten ausländischen Investition, der Goldmine Kumtor, die einen erheblichen Anteil an BIP (2012: 5,5%) und Industrieproduktion (2012: 46%) hat… Gold ist auch wichtigstes Ausfuhrgut Kirgisistans. 2011 lag sein Anteil an den Ausfuhren bei 45% und in den ersten zehn Monaten 2012 trotz Problemen in der Mine Kumtor immerhin noch bei 24%.“ Auswärtiges Amt

Einer der Gründe, aus denen der Neoliberalismus überall die Staatskassen leert und Völker in Schuldknechtschaft bringt, ist der Zugriff auf Rohstoffe. Wen man hungern lässt, der denkt nicht an Umweltverseuchung, wenn Konzerne Schürfrechte einfordern. Gerade Kanadas Schürffirmen gehen dabei oft rücksichtslos vor und gefährden Umwelt, Trinkwasser und die Gesundheit der Bevölkerung. Die Kumtor-Goldmine die ist größte von einer westlichen Firma betriebene Goldmine in Zentralasien. Das kanadische Unternehmen „Cameco“ begann dort Ende 1996 mit dem Goldabbau, mittlerweile hat „Centerra Gold“ das Geschäft übernommen, die 2004 aus dem Mutterunternehmen Cameco ausgegliedert wurde. Die Kumtor-Mine ist ihr Filetstück und fördert etwa 20 Tonnen Gold jährlich, wobei sie zur Gewinnung des Metalls eine giftige chemische Lösung verwendet. Eine Grundkomponente dieser Lösung ist Zyanid, als Salz der Blausäure wasserlöslich und hochgiftig. Angeblich sei das nicht gefährlich für Mensch und Umwelt, betont Rodin Stuparek, Direktor der Umweltschutz-Abteilung in Kumtor in dw. „Wir gehen sehr verantwortungsvoll mit dem Zyanid um.“

Seit dem Unfall vom Mai 1998 bei Barskoon glaubt man den Kanadiern nicht mehr. Damals stürzte in der Nähe der Ortschaft Barskoon ein LKW mit einer Ladung von mehr als 20 Tonnen Zyanid für die Goldmine Kumtor in einen Fluss, aus dem sich die Bevölkerung mit Trinkwasser versorgt. Unklar ist bis heute, wie viele Menschen damals an Zyanid-Vergiftung starben. Heute erinnert man sich noch an die Panik, die damals um sich griff. Die Regierung hatte die Menschen nicht über die Gefahren informiert, aber die Leute wurden plötzlich umgesiedelt, auf die andere Seite des Sees.

Kirgisistan, Tunesien Zentralasiens

Kirgistan gilt als das Tunesien Zentralasiens: Seine parlamentarische Demokratie funktioniert einigermaßen gut, im Vergleich der von Despotien dominierten Region. Der Weg dahin war nicht einfach: Der autoritäre Ex-Präsident Kurmanbek Bakijew galt nach der kirgisischen Tulpenrevolution 2005 als Hoffnungsträger, war zunächst Chef der Übergangsregierung. Noch selben Jahr gewann er die Neuwahlen und wurde Präsident, nur um 2010 bei erneuten Massenprotesten mit vielen Toten wieder aus dem Amt gejagt zu werden.

Bakijew

Ex-Präsident Bakijew wegen vielfachen Mordes in Abwesenheit verurteilt

Jüngst wurde Bakijew in Abwesenheit wegen Mordversuchs zu 25 Jahren Haft verurteilt, weil er einen Mordanschlag in Bischkek 2006 in Auftrag gegeben hatte – Weißrussland verweigert die Auslieferung. Zielperson war ein britischer Geschäftsmann, der sich im Auftrag eines ausländischen Unternehmens mit der Regierung um die Goldmine Kumtor stritt. Der Brite hatte das Attentat schwer verletzt überlebt. Bakijews beträchtliches Vermögen wurde vom Gericht beschlagnahmt. Der Ex-Präsident lebt mit seiner Familie im Exil in Weißrussland, das eine Auslieferung ablehnt. Sein Bruder Schanybek, ehemaliger Chef des Staatsschutzes, und sein Sohn Maxim wurden im selben Fall ebenfalls in Abwesenheit zu lebenslanger Haft verurteilt. Ein zweiter Sohn, Marat Bakijew, erhielt 20 Jahre Gefängnis. Bakijew war im Februar bereits wegen dreifachen Mordes zu 24 Jahren Haft verurteilt worden. Dabei hatte der blutige, aber dem Westen zugeneigte Diktator Bakijew durchaus Freunde im Ausland, z.B. bei der deutschen Tageszeitung taz, die ihm nach seinem Sturz tränenreich nachweinte und gefühlvoll seine „Flucht unter Kirschbäume“ schilderte:

DSCHALALABAD taz | Eine Jurte steht zwischen blühenden Kirschbäumen. Darin sitzt, frisch rasiert und in einem grauen Anzug, der aus Bischkek geflohene kirgisische Präsident Kurmanbek Bakijew in einem grünen Sessel. Der Handdruck ist weich. „Ich bin nach wie vor der Präsident Kirgisiens“, sagt Bakijew mit sanfter Stimme…“taz 12.4.2010

Heute kämpft der neue Präsident Almasbek Atambajew für die Aufhebung des Abkommens aus dem Jahre 2009, in dem der damalige Präsident Bakijew den kanadischen Goldausbeutern günstige Produktionsbedingungen und Steuererleichterungen eingeräumt hatte.

Gold, Geopolitik und Militärbasen

In Kirgisistan, auch Kirgisien genannt, gibt es eine relativ freie Presse und eine vielfältige Parteienlandschaft. Doch die Wirtschaft kommt trotz großartiger Versprechungen der westlichen Investoren nicht in Gang, obwohl viele Milliarden an Gold aus dem Land geschafft wurden. Ein beträchtlicher Teil der arbeitsfähigen Bevölkerung verdient als Gastarbeiter in Russland Geld, das in die Heimat zurückfließt. Leider liegt das Land im Visier der US-Geopolitik: Ein US-Luftwaffenstützpunkt für den Afghanistankrieg, 2001 mit Putins Zustimmung errichtet, damals mit Washington im „Kampf gegen den Terror“ noch traulich vereint, später errichtete Russland wenige Kilometer davon entfernt eine eigene Militärbasis.

USAirforce

US-Airforce-Humor

Die Luftwaffenbasis am Flughafen Manas in Kirgistan ist seit 2001 der wichtigste Luftumschlagplatz der US-Streitkräfte für den Krieg in Afghanistan und auch für den inzwischen begonnenen Rückzug. Der Flughafen Manas liegt unweit der Hauptstadt Bischkek besteht aus einer Containerstadt, die von Betonmauern umgeben ist. Im Mai 2013 kündigte die kirgisische Regierung die Verträge mit den USA über die Basis Manas zum Juni 2014. Hintergrund sind wieder enger werdende Beziehungen zu Russland.

2012 hatte Putin ein Milliarden-Programm für den Ausbau der Wasserkraft angeboten, Kirgisiens zweitem Reichtum neben den Bodenschätzen. Dazu noch einen Schuldenerlass und die Übernahme des maroden kirgisischen Gasnetzes durch die russische Gazprom, Gerhard Schröder lässt grüßen. Bereits 2008 hatte Russland Kirgistan Unterstützung angeboten, um die Abhängigkeit vom Westen zu verringern. Der damalige Präsident Bakijew nahm die Entwicklungshilfe, doch die US-Militärbasis blieb im Land, sie wurde lediglich in „Transitzentrum“ umbenannt. 2010 fegte ein Aufstand Bakijew aus dem Land und seither kam das Land Moskau wieder näher, wozu vermutlich auch die katastrophalen Erfahrungen mit den Goldplünderern aus Kanada ihren Beitrag leistete.

Mein Name ist Hasipedia –ich weiß von nichts

Die deutsche Wikipedia weiß übrigens nichts vom verzweifelten Kampf der Kirgisen um ihr Gold und ihr Leben gegen die zynische Goldgier westlicher Firmen. Dort zeichnen die von Firmen-Lobbyisten dominierten oder sonstwie geschmierten „Wikipedianer“ eine fröhliches Bild von funktionierender Demokratie und bunter Folklore.

Sogar die ARD-Tagesschau meldet, was Wikipedia nicht weiß: „Im Nordosten Kirgistans liegt eine der größten Goldminen der Welt, eine kanadische Firma baut das Gold dort ab. Doch anstatt Wohlstand für die Bevölkerung bringt die Mine eine massive Zerstörung der Natur mit sich.“ Goldabbau in Kirgistan: Viel Schaden, wenig Nutzen

WikipeCIA will offenbar nicht, dass die dummen Deutschen etwas vom Gold in Kirgistan mitkriegen, obwohl dies sogar auf der Website des deutschen AA (Bundesaußenministerium) zu lesen steht –wo man zwar immerhin vom Gold, aber nicht von den seltenen Erden der Kirgisen weiß.

Gerade in Europa, wo ökologisches Bewusstsein und hohe Bildung die Menschen kritisch machen, versucht die neoliberale Finanz- und Goldmafia Staaten in die Pleite zu treiben, um billig an ihre Bodenschätze zu gelangen: Griechenland und Spanien sind vielleicht nicht zufällig ins Fadenkreuz der Finanzbetrüger geraten, dort lagern große Goldvorräte. In zerschlagenen Staaten meinen Ausbeutungsfirmen sich nicht groß um die Zyanidverseuchung des Trinkwassers und die Zerstörung ganzer Landstriche sorgen zu müssen, wenn sie das Gold säckeweise aus dem Boden holen und wegschleppen.

Kampf gegen den Goldraub in Chalkidiki

Das Gold von Hellas

Finanzkrise und Goldrausch: Madrid und Athen

Griechenland 2016 größter Goldproduzent Europas

 Объекты, на которых «Центерра Голд» ведет работы

 

4 Gedanken zu “Centerra Gold unter Druck: Proteste in Kirgisistan

  1. Bakijew hatte viele Freunde in den USA, kein Wunder:

    „As the only U.S.-operated transit facility in Central Asia, the Manas Transit Center plays a critical role in
    transporting U.S. and coalition personnel and equipment as part of President Obama’s Afghanistan strategy.

    In 2009, the Transit Center served on average some 24,000 transiting Coalition forces and some 450 short tons of cargo per month. In January 2010, approximately 30,000 personnel and 600 short tons of cargo passed through the Transit Center, and it will likely remain at capacity over the next six months.

    The Transit Center also provides 30 percent of the air refueling over Afghanistan.“

    Volle US-Depesche aus Bishkek:

    http://www.cabledrum.net/cables/10BISHKEK113

    Reference ID: 10BISHKEK113
    Subject: SCENESETTER FOR SRAP HOLBROOKE’S VISIT TO KYRGYZSTAN
    Origin: Embassy Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
    Created: 16 Feb 2010 Released: 30 Aug 2011

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 000113

    SIPDIS

    FOR SRAP AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2020
    TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KG
    SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SRAP HOLBROOKE’S VISIT TO
    KYRGYZSTAN

    Classified By: Ambassador Tatiana C. Gfoeller, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and
    (d).

    1. (C) Embassy Bishkek welcomes the visit of Special
    Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard C.
    Holbrooke to Kyrgyzstan on February 19. Your visit comes at
    a timely period as the U.S.-Kyrgyzstan relationship has
    experienced positive momentum since the signing of the new
    agreement for the Transit Center at Manas International
    Airport. Your visit will provide an opportunity to express
    the U.S.’s appreciation for using the Transit Center and
    emphasize to the Kyrgyz the importance we place on our
    bilateral relationship, as well as brief on U.S. goals in
    Afghanistan.

    U.S.-KYRGYZSTAN RELATIONSHIP
    —————————-

    2. (C) Since the signing of the Transit Center agreement in
    the summer of 2009, the U.S.-Kyrgyzstan partnership has
    improved significantly as the Government of Kyrgyzstan moved
    closer to the U.S. In September, President Bakiyev made an
    extremely successful and public visit to the Transit Center
    to participate in a September 11th memorial service. Based
    on recent meetings with senior government officials, it
    appears that the Government of Kyrgyzstan is interested in
    working with the U.S. and building a closer relationship. At
    the same time, the Government of Kyrgyzstan is also actively
    reviewing the state of its relationships with its neighbors,
    Russia, and China, seeking a balance which would best serve
    its interests. The Kyrgyz government has been watching
    carefully President Obama’s strategy in Afghanistan,
    especially the transfer of responsibility to the Afghan
    government in 2011, and a key concern of the government is
    what role the U.S. intends to play in Kyrgyzstan in the
    medium and long-term.

    MANAS TRANSIT CENTER
    ——————–

    3. (C) As the only U.S.-operated transit facility in Central
    Asia, the Manas Transit Center plays a critical role in
    transporting U.S. and coalition personnel and equipment as
    part of President Obama’s Afghanistan strategy. In 2009, the
    Transit Center served on average some 24,000 transiting
    Coalition forces and some 450 short tons of cargo per month.
    In January 2010, approximately 30,000 personnel and 600 short
    tons of cargo passed through the Transit Center, and it will
    likely remain at capacity over the next six months. The
    Transit Center also provides 30 percent of the air refueling
    over Afghanistan.

    4. (C) The Transit Center Agreement requires that the U.S.
    notify Kyrgyzstan by April 14 if it intends to renew the
    agreement for another year. We have received no indication
    from the Kyrgyz that they are looking to renegotiate the
    agreement this year. However, it is clear to us that they
    are following very closely our compliance with its terms and
    with other commitments we have made, reviewing the benefits
    they derive from their cooperation with the U.S., and judging
    our long-term commitment to the region. If they decide their
    interests are not being served by the agreement as it stands,
    there is no doubt that they will reopen negotiations. The
    key issues in the Kyrgyz appraisal will likely be the $15
    million quarterly payment, the construction projects at the
    airport/Transit Center, the air traffic control project, the
    Economic Development Fund, levels of continuing U.S.
    assistance, implementation of joint security at the Transit
    Center, promised counternarcotics and counter-terrorism
    funding, and economic benefits from contracting from both the
    Transit Center and the Northern Distribution Network.

    POLITICAL OVERVIEW

    BISHKEK 00000113 002 OF 003

    ——————

    5. (C) Since its independence nearly 18 years ago, Kyrgyzstan
    has been noteworthy for the relative openness of its
    political discourse and vibrancy of its civil society.
    Although still the leader in the region, Kyrgyzstan remains a
    fledgling democracy. It boasts a political opposition, an
    independent press that occasionally criticizes the
    government, and credible freedoms of religion, speech and
    assembly. However, recent trends find the government dialing
    back on these basic rights.

    6. (C) In July 2009, President Bakiyev was re-elected as
    President in an election that many international observers
    characterized as flawed. Over the past several years,
    President Bakiyev has moved to consolidate political power
    and to divide and suppress the opposition. Opposition
    political parties face ongoing harassment, and the government
    actively uses criminal charges to threaten opposition
    leaders. In 2009, a number of opposition politicians and
    journalists were attacked and beaten, culminating in the
    death in Almaty, Kazakhstan, of Gennady Pavlyuk, a Kyrgyz
    journalist. To date, Kyrgyz and Kazakh authorities have not
    made any arrests in the Pavlyuk case.

    ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
    —————–

    7. (C) Under Bakiyev, state budget expenditures — including
    salaries and pensions — have grown steadily, but poverty
    remains widespread. In 2009, Kyrgyzstan benefited from
    significantly increased financial support from the
    international financial institutions and other donors. In
    addition, the Russian government has provided a $150 million
    grant and a $300 million low-interest loan to the Kyrgyz
    government in 2009. With much of its financial system
    isolated from global markets, Kyrgyzstan weathered the
    effects of the global economic downturn relatively well. The
    economic slowdown in Russia and Kazakhstan, however, severely
    reduced the amount of remittances Kyrgyz workers sent home.
    Kyrgyz workers abroad send home an estimated $1 billion, or
    20-25% of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP, annually. (Russia and Kazakhstan
    provide jobs for nearly 1 million Kyrgyz workers, or over one
    third of the workforce.) In addition, pervasive corruption
    at all levels of government is a barrier to economic
    development, effective service provision, and foreign
    investment.

    BORDER ISSUES
    ————-

    8. (C) The absence of demarcated and delineated borders
    between Kyrgyzstan and its Tajik and Uzbek neighbors has
    fueled occasional clashes between residents and each
    government’s border services. In addition, the government is
    hyper-sensitive to the threat of Islamic separatism in the
    South. In May 2009, IMU/IJU militants launched attacks on
    Uzbek security facilities on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border, and an
    additional militant blew himself up outside a police station
    in Andijon, Uzbekistan. The Uzbek government claimed that
    these attacks were launched from Kyrgyz soil. In June,
    Kyrgyz security forces located and clashed with IMU/IJU
    militants linked to the May attacks in Uzbekistan in various
    villages in southern Kyrgyzstan, resulting in the deaths of
    nine militants and one police officer.

    U.S. ASSISTANCE
    —————

    9. (C) The U.S. has a range of active bilateral assistance
    programs, including IMET, FMF, EXBS, and INL. USAID is
    providing over $20 million in assistance to Kyrgyzstan, with
    programs in economic growth, health care, education, and

    BISHKEK 00000113 003 OF 003

    democracy and governance. The Kyrgyz government, however, is
    deeply suspicious of some democracy programming, believing
    that the U.S. uses these programs to fund the political
    opposition, destabilize the country, and foster „color
    revolutions.“ Government hardliners complain about the
    National Democratic Institute and other democracy
    implementers as being biased against the government and
    interfering with domestic politics.

    MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT
    ————————–

    10. (C) During your meeting with President Bakiyev, he is
    certain to raise his „Bishkek Initiative,“ a proposal to host
    an international conference on security and stability in the
    Central Asia region, including Afghanistan, for which he will
    be seeking U.S. support. At the Turkey conference on
    Afghanistan in January, Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Sarbayev gave
    Deputy SRAP Paul Jones a non-paper detailing the „Bishkek
    Initiative.“ Your expression of interest in at least hearing
    more details about how the Kyrgyz envision this initiative
    will please Bakiyev.
    GFOELLER

  2. Die US-Regierung beobachtete die Beziehung Moskau-Bischkek sehr genau:

    Russian officials are closely watching the U.S.-Uzbek thaw for any renewed U.S. military ties with Uzbekistan. Russia seems less cautious regarding U. S. economic engagement with Uzbekistan, particularly if U.S.investment helps to improve the overall economic climate in the country.

    http://www.cabledrum.net/diff/10MOSCOW337

    Reference ID: 10MOSCOW337
    Subject: RUSSIAN RELATIONS WITH AN ASSERTIVE UZBEKISTAN
    Origin: Embassy Moscow, Russia Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
    Created: 17 Feb 2010 Released: 18 Feb 2011

    ——————-
    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000337

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, SCA, INR

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020
    TAGS: PGOV, PREL, UZ, RS
    SUBJECT: RUSSIAN RELATIONS WITH AN ASSERTIVE UZBEKISTAN

    MOSCOW 00000337 001.2 OF 002

    C…

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000337 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, SCA, INR E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, UZ, RS

    SUBJECT: RUSSIAN RELATIONS WITH AN ASSERTIVE UZBEKISTAN MOSCOW 00000337 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Susan M. Elliott for reason
    s: 1.4 (b), (d).
    1. (C) Summary: In recent meetings, MFA and Uzbek Embassy
    officials stressed the positive aspects of Russian-Uzbek
    relations, including bilateral trade anQd Uzbek migrant
    workers in Russia. Uzbek President Karimov is due to visit
    Moscow in April following intergovernmental talks.
    Meanwhile, Russian officials have expressed frustration with
    Uzbek unwillingness to follow Russian proposals in regional
    fora and with Uzbekistan’s tense relations with its weaker
    neighbors. An Uzbek Embassy official was quick to highlight
    the „new political dynamics“ in the region, in which an
    increasingly assertive Uzbekistan stands up for its national
    interest. Comment: Russian officials are closely watching the
    U.S.-Uzbek thaw for any renewed U.S. military ties with
    Uzbekistan. Russia seems less cautious regarding
    U. S. economic engagement with Uzbekistan, particularly if U.S.
    investment helps to improve the overall economic climate in
    the country. End Summary.
    Partners, but No Longer Strategic?
    ———————————-
    2. (C) MFA Third CIS Department Second Secretary Kiril
    Belikov told poloff that Uzbekistan is Russia’s „second
    partner“ in the region, after Kazakhstan, noting that
    Uzbekistan has the largest and fastest growing population in
    former-Soviet Central Asia (27 million) and influences ethnic
    Uzbek minorities in all of its neighboring countries,
    including Afghanistan. In a separate meeting, Second
    Secretary Yekaterina Chistova said that relations with
    Uzbekistan are fundamentally strong, despite some negative
    aspects, and noted that regular high-level bilateral dialogue
    resumed in 2009. Following President Medvedev’s trip early
    in 2009, FM Lavrov visited Tashkent in December, the first
    Russian FM visit since 2005, according to MFA officials.
    Uzbek Embassy officials told us that President Karimov is
    scheduled to visit Moscow in late April, following upcoming
    intergovernmental meetings chaired by the Uzbek PM and
    Russian Deputy PM Sergei Ivanov.
    3. (C) Uzbek Embassy Political Counselor Farkhad Khamraev
    termed relations with Russia as „stable and positive,“
    although he was quick to dispel any perception that Russia
    still dominated the relationship. He said the West should
    understand that „the old political dynamics in the region
    have changed,“ and that Uzbekistan pursued its own national
    interest. Offering an example of the „new dynamics,“
    Khamraev (quite boldly) claimed that Russia scaled down its
    plans for a military base in southern Kyrgyzstan after the
    Uzbeks voiced concerns about its proximity to their border.
    He said the facility would now be used as a training center
    for the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
    4. (C) Stressing that stability is Russia’s primary interest
    in Central Asia, MFA officials said that Russia has urged
    Uzbekistan to resolve ongoing border water and electricity
    disputes with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, but that there has
    been a lack of „political will.“ The Uzbek Embassy’s
    Khamraev maintained that Russia supported Uzbek views on
    water rights in the region and that this was not a point of
    disagreement with Moscow. In regional multilateral
    groupings, MFA Department of Asia-Pacific Cooperation
    officials cited a number of Russian proposals which the
    Uzbeks have effectively blocked. Khamraev said that
    Uzbekistan wanted to ensure that its voice was heard among
    the larger players. He said Uzbekistan has chosen not to
    participate in certain Shanghai Cooperation Organization
    (SCO) activities, despite currently serving as the SCO
    Chairman, and has halted its cooperation with the Eurasian
    Economic Community because „Uzbekistan was better off with
    bilateral discussions.“ Khamraev said the CSTO was a
    worthwhile security grouping that could provide some security
    guarantees, but that Uzbekistan participated selectively
    according to its national interests. Moscow experts noted MOSCOW 00000337 002.2 OF 002 that Uzbekistan has refused to join the CSTO Rapid Reaction
    Force, a decision that renders the CSTO „worthless“ as a
    regional security grouping in the opinion of Moscow Carnegie
    Center’s Alexei Malashenko.
    5. (C) Central Asia expert Ivan Safranchuk, publisher of the
    journal „Bolshaya Igra“ (The Great Game), told us that
    Karimov’s personal relationship with Medvedev has been sour
    from the beginning. Safranchuk said Karimov has shown little
    respect for Medvedev and once told PM Putin (allegedly in
    Medvedev’s presence) that Putin should have found a way to
    remain the Russian President. Safranchuk added that
    Gazprom’s clumsy handling of Uzbek interests in the Caspian
    gas pipeline project dispelled Uzbek notions that Russia was
    a „strategic partner.“ Safranchuk also maintained that the
    „real Karimov“ was genuinely eager for respect and good
    relations with the U.S. and the West, as he was in late 2001,
    and that he was not the Karimov we saw after the fallout over
    Andijon.
    Resilient Economic Ties
    ———————–
    6. (C) Separately, both the MFA’s Chistova and the Uzbek
    Embassy’s Khamraev emphasized the resilience of the bilateral
    economic relationship. Chistova said that while annual
    bilateral trade fell by 30-35 percent in the economic crisis,
    to around USD 2 billion, the drop was less than that with
    many of Russia’s European trading partners. Noting Russia is
    Uzbekistan’s largest foreign market, Khamraev said that
    bilateral trade was relatively unaffected by the crisis, with
    the exception of a large drop in automobile exports to
    Russia. He added that trade prospects were promising and, in
    particular, that discussions were underway to export Uzbek
    cotton directly to Russia, bypassing European markets.
    Mutual Dependence on Migrants
    —————————–
    7. (C) MFA and Uzbek Embassy officials also highlighted the
    mutual importance of Uzbek migrant workers in Russia. The
    MFA’s Chistova estimated that between two and three million
    Uzbeks work in Russia, including illegal workers, and that
    annual remittances from Uzbek workers in Russia total more
    than USD 2 billion. Chistova also underscored that Uzbek
    migrants help to maintain important cultural ties by learning
    the Russian language and culture. The Uzbek Embassy’s
    Khamraev claimed annual remittances were closer to USD 3
    billion, off 10-20 percent from their peak before the
    economic crisis, and that the two governments will discuss an
    agreement on migrant labor at meetings in March. Suggesting
    that leverage on migrant labor issues is no longer one-sided,
    Khamraev argued that despite political rhetoric, high
    unemployment figures, and the recent uptick in birth rates,
    Russia has a critical long-term need for foreign labor.
    8. (C) Comment: Beyond official pleasantries, Russian
    relations with an increasingly assertive Uzbekistan remain
    prickly. Russia has limited leverage with Uzbekistan on
    regional issues and within regional fora such as the SCO and
    CSTO. Uzbek assertiveness in the region is likely only to
    grow, and some Moscow analysts expect Uzbekistan’s population
    to approach 50 million by 2050. Meanwhile, Russian officials
    are closely watching developments in the U.S.-Uzbek thaw.
    Given Russian sensitivities about foreign military activities
    in Central Asia, a renewed U.S. military relationship with
    Uzbekistan is likely Russia’s greatest concern. Russian
    officials have said they consider NATO activities in its
    backyard to be temporary and limited to supporting the
    international coalition in Afghanistan. In contrast to its
    „sphere of privileged interests“ in the military sense,
    Russia appears less resistant to U.S. and other foreign
    economic influence in Central Asia, and may even welcome U.S.
    investment in certain sectors, as Russian firms stand to
    benefit from improved economic policies and infrastructure
    that such foreign investment may bring. End Comment.
    Beyrle

  3. Wer die US-Sicht dazu lesen möchte…

    Zum Putsch gegen Bakijew:

    „Some Western and Russian media and Russian analysts have asserted that Russia largely
    orchestrated the coup because of dissatisfaction that Baliyev had not closed the Manas Transit
    Center as promised.
    In contrast, the coup in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 was attributed by some officials
    in Russia and Central Asia to influence by the United States through pro-democracy assistance to
    non-governmental organizations. The United States denied any direct influence. According to this
    Russian triumphalist view, however, Bakiyev’s ouster represents the removal of a regional leader
    who had been backed by the United States.“ Jim Nichol 2010, p.5

    The April 2010 Coup in Kyrgyzstan: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests
    Jim Nichol
    April 2010
    CRS Report for Congress
    Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

    Klicke, um auf R41178.pdf zuzugreifen

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